Particularismo político alrededor del mundo by Jessica Seddon Wallack et al.
Inter-American Development Bank










*Graduate School of Business, Stanford University *Graduate School of Business, Stanford University *Graduate School of Business, Stanford University *Graduate School of Business, Stanford University
** ** ** **Fedesarrollo Fedesarrollo Fedesarrollo Fedesarrollo
***Inter-American Development Bank ***Inter-American Development Bank ***Inter-American Development Bank ***Inter-American Development Bank
January 20022
Cataloging-in-Publication data provided by the
Inter-American Development Bank
Felipe Herrera Library
Political particularism around the world / by Jessica Seddon … [et al.].
p. cm.   (Research Department Working paper series ; 463)
Includes bibliographical references.
1. Elections--Economic aspects.   2. Political candidates.  3. Political campaigns.      I.
Seddon, Jessica.   II. Inter-American Development Bank. Research  Dept.    III. Series.
324   P520--------dc21
2002
Inter-American Development Bank
1300 New York Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20577
The views and interpretations in this document are those of the authors and should not be
attributed to the Inter-American Development Bank, or to any individual acting on its behalf.
The Research Department (RES) produces the Latin American Economic Policies Newsletter, as
well as working papers and books, on diverse economic issues.




This paper presents a new dataset on electoral systems and outlines its potential
uses in further research exploring the connections between electoral systems and
economic outcomes.  The dataset provides indicators of the degree to which
individual politicians can further their careers by appealing to narrow geographic
constituencies on the one hand, or party constituencies on the other.
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at Harvard University’s Center for Basic Research in the Social Sciences, Inter-American Development Bank, and
LACEA PEG meeting in Cartagena for useful comments. The usual caveats apply. The dataset that this paper refers
to can be downloaded from Ugo Panizza’s website at www.geocities.com/upanizza/particular.zip.45
1. Introduction
The number of empirical papers linking political institutions to economic outcomes is growing
rapidly.  Theories about the connections between institutions and economic outcomes are
becoming increasingly sophisticated and delivering ever more detailed and testable predictions.
However, the study of electoral systems and economic policies is a relatively new area.  The
effects of electoral systems on the policymaking environment have been analyzed extensively in
the large literature on how electoral systems shape political outcomes, such as the number of
parties or the type of governments (majority, minority, coalition).  Other studies suggest
connections between government types and economic outcomes, especially in fiscal policy.
1
Few have drawn these two literatures together to analyze, empirically or theoretically, the
possible connections between electoral systems and economic outcomes.
2
This paper presents a new dataset on electoral systems and outlines its potential uses in
further research exploring the connections between electoral systems and economic outcomes.
The dataset, comprised of information on electoral systems past and present, provides indicators
of the degree to which individual politicians can further their careers by appealing to narrow
geographic constituencies on the one hand, or party constituencies on the other.
There are several areas of political economy for which this information is useful. The
manner in which politicians further their careers is likely to influence how they manifest the
“opportunism” that much of political economy assumes.  Politicians who must please narrow
geographical constituencies are likely to advocate narrower, more particularistic policies than
those who further their career by following party dictates.  Differences in the effective arbiters of
policymakers’ careers may influence the way that interest groups can affect policymaking. In
systems where politicians’ careers are determined by the will of their constituency, interest
groups must channel their demands through the district-level politics. In systems where
                                                          
1 Grilli, Masciandaro, and Tabellini (1991) and Kontopoulos and Perotti (2000), for example, argue that coalition
governments are more likely to suffer from common-pool problems that can lead to larger overall government
spending. Roubini and Sachs (1989) suggest that the association between coalition governments and deficits is due
to the fact that coalition governments contain more veto-players and are thus less able to respond to economic
shocks. Alesina and Tabellini (1990) observe the frequency of government collapse under coalition governments
and hypothesize that coalition governments are more myopic in policymaking, hence prone to larger deficits.
2 Some recent exceptions include Milesi-Ferreti, Perotti, and Rostagno (2000) on electoral systems and composition
of public expenditure, and Persson and Tabellini’s (2000) wide-ranging empirical analysis of the effect of electoral
rules on fiscal policy outcomes. Another empirical paper, Gaviria, Panizza, Seddon and Stein (1999) focuses on the
links between electoral system and reform policies.6
candidates’ future is determined by party favor, interest groups may gain more influence by
going to the party leaders who oversee politicians based in a number of districts.
Differences in politicians’ incentives to appeal to narrow geographic constituencies
versus party policies may explain cross-country differences in the division of public spending
between broad and targeted programs, for example.  Milesi-Ferreti, Perotti, and Rostagno (2000),
find that more party-oriented governments tend to have higher transfers and lower shares of
public goods in government expenditures. They interpret these findings as evidence for the idea
that legislators with narrow constituencies will purchase goods and target public goods to
enhance their electoral appeal, while parties (and the legislators who carry out their policies) will
be more likely to use broader transfers to attract votes.  Baqir (1999) finds that narrow
constituencies (i.e., smaller districts) are associated with greater per capita city government
spending.  The use of other distortionary policies to redistribute income to narrow interest groups
is also likely to be related to politicians’ incentives. Seddon (2001) documents a positive
relationship between particularism and trade protection.
The degree of particularism is also likely to affect a political system’s ability to resolve
conflicts in policymaking.  Systems where each politician is attentive to narrow interests are
likely to complicate agreement within the legislature.  At the same time, party-centered systems
may lack the institutional channels for competing views to be expressed and resolved in
sustainable policies. Particularistic systems have a definite advantage in terms of representation
and in terms of building incentives for legislators to gather information on the preferences of
their constituencies.  Particularistic systems can also generate mechanisms of yardstick
competition among legislators and improve the efficiency of the political process.   
Gaviria, Panizza, Seddon and Stein (2000) show that there is a correlation between the
measures of particularism described in this paper and a country’s ability to recover from crisis.
In particular, they show that in countries where politicians balance the demands of parties and
constituents (i.e., where the index of particularism assumes an intermediate value) are more
likely to recover growth after crisis than countries where political careers are dominated by party
dictates or voter wishes. Using the same dataset, Panizza (2000) finds that intermediate levels of
particularism are associated with higher quality government institutions.
These results corroborate Shugart’s (1999) argument that differences in the way that
legislators further their careers affect the feasibility of collective action for reform policies.  He7
presents a series of case studies that suggest that electoral reform is a helpful pre-condition for
extensive economic reforms in systems with extreme levels of particularism or party-
centeredness.
Finally, the panel dataset is useful for analysts of electoral reform, comparative
institutions, or institutional change. While much of the literature on the determinants of electoral
change is drawn from individual country experiences, this dataset provides a dependent variable
for testing some of these theories across countries.
The next section describes the details of the dataset. There are two parts: first, a group of
variables based on electoral formulas; and second, a collection of other variables that provide
some indicators of politicians’ incentives to advocate particularistic policies. The subsequent
section provides some summary statistics for the dataset and discusses differences across
geographical and economic regions.
2. Electoral Formulas
The collection of the data on electoral formulas was guided by Carey and Shugart’s (1995,
hereafter CS95) theoretical work on the incentives that different electoral formulas create to
cultivate a personal vote and Shugart’s (1999) work on the connections between economic and
electoral reform. The papers propose two versions of an index that measures the strength of
incentives that electoral laws create for politicians to adhere to party platforms or to build
personal support bases in particular geographical constituencies.
The index described in CS95 is designed to “propose a method to estimate the relative
value to legislators (and legislative candidates) of personal reputations versus party reputations
for advancing political careers.”  They consider party control over access to and rank on ballots,
extent to which candidates rely on personal votes independent of their co-partisans, the number
and specificity of citizens’ votes, and district magnitude. Shugart (1999) further differentiates
among the party-centered countries by considering the degree of centralization of leadership
within parties as well. The Shugart (1999) framework focuses on the same set of electoral laws8
as CS95, but creates a finer categorization of systems by introducing coding for the influence of
“camarillas,” or small party cliques.
3
As in CS95 our electoral formula variables range from zero for the systems where
politicians’ careers depend most on party fortunes to two for systems where candidates focus
most on narrow geographical constituencies.  We were not able to collect the detailed
information on legal party structure and informal norms that would be required to follow
Shugart’s more elaborate coding scheme for a large sample of countries over 20 years.
Our panel dataset, covering a maximum of 155 countries from 1978-1997, relies on the
Inter-Parliamentary Union’s (IPU) annual Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections and
Developments and the online Parline database. We also consulted the International IDEA
Handbook of Electoral System Design, and the Manual de los Partidos Políticos de América
Latina in cases where the IPU information was not complete.  Although many countries did not
change their electoral systems over the sample period, the panel dataset can identify countries
that went through an electoral reform in the period under consideration. One caveat regarding
the panel dataset is that the information on electoral systems is less detailed in the earlier
editions.  Ambiguities in coding are noted in an accompanying spreadsheet.
Our dataset includes countries with varying degrees of democracy during the period
under consideration. Some of the legislatures described in the IPU’s annual summary are not the
primary policymakers and thus their incentives to cater to parties or geographical constituencies
are less relevant for policy outcomes. We leave it to the data user to define the level of
democracy for which legislators’ incentives are relevant for policy outcomes. In past work we
have used the Polity III composite index for democracy to control for the effects of electoral
systems in varying governance environments on economic policy outcomes. We have also used a
dummy variable for democracy that takes a value of one for Polity III index scores above four
out of a possible score of ten for the most democratic systems.
4   
Our index of political particularism has three components: (i) Ballot, (ii) Pool, and (iii)
Vote.
                                                          
3 The 1995 index runs from 0 being the most “party centered” to 2 being the most “candidate centered,” while the
1998 index reverses this scale and adds a second dimension to produce an index that can range from 2 at the most
camarilla-centered to –2 at the most candidate centered.
4 The Polity III data and updated Polity IV dataset can be obtained online at
http://www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/polity/#data. We use the variable “democ.”9
Ballot describes relative strength of parties and citizens in shaping candidates’ access to
the ballot and a plausible chance of being elected. Electoral systems with party control over
access to the ballot and candidate order in the ballot give parties control over entry into politics.
Systems with low independent candidacy requirements and plurality (as opposed to the stricter
absolute majority requirement) races offer voters more influence over the electoral process from
nomination to actual election.
CS95 describe ballot as a measure of the “degree of control party leaders exercise over
access to their party’s label.” Their paper identifies two dimensions of party control over
politicians’ futures: control over party endorsements and control over ballot rank in electoral list
systems. In their coding system, electoral systems are rated zero if parties present a fixed ballot
and voters may not disturb the list, one if party endorsement is required, but voters can alter the
order of the candidates, and two if parties do not control access to the ballot.
5
The rationale behind our coding is similar. A code of zero means that voters can only
choose a party and cannot demonstrate a preference for any individual. Closed-list electoral
systems, where parties present a fixed slate of candidates that must be voted on as a whole, are
the most common type in this category. Candidates have a strong incentive to cater to the party
rather than constituents in order to be chosen and to be placed in a viable spot near the top of the
list.
6  A code of one means that voters can choose among a limited set of candidates.  Those
limits are set de jure by party leaders and electoral laws or de facto by implausibility of
successful independent candidacies. We code systems where there are high formal and informal
barriers to independent candidates as one. Politicians in this group of electoral systems must
balance efforts to please the party with efforts to attract constituent support.  We code systems
where voters choose from an essentially unrestricted set of representatives as two.  These include
systems where independents run and often win seats. Candidates in this group focus exclusively
on gaining support within their constituency and there is little need to gain party favor.
Defining zero as closed list where parties had control over candidate identity and position
was straightforward, but distinguishing between one (systems in which party nominations are
                                                          
5 A later version of the index, presented in Shugart (1999) differentiates among alternate ways that parties can
designate candidates, in particular whether nominees are chosen by broad party agreement or an elite party
leadership. We are unable to differentiate among various forms of intra-party selection of candidates and determine
how much influence voters have on party choices in the broad sample of countries for which we collect information
on electoral systems.10
required, but voters influence the relative success of candidates from same party) and two (low
party control where candidates can enter the ballot and plausibly win without party nomination
or imposition of order) was harder.  We use the procedures for independent candidates and the
history of successful independent candidates to supplement scarce information on party
nomination procedures when differentiating between scores of one and two.  Some cases were
clear: in Papua New Guinea, for example, 38 out of 109 seats were held by independents in
1996.  We coded this country as a two for ballot, as party control over the voters’ candidate
options is only as strong as the party monopoly on successful political campaigns. Political
entrepreneurs will have few incentives to adhere to party rules if they can easily bypass them.
We turned to the outcome measure of the number and size of represented parties in
ambiguous cases where electoral and candidacy rules could be classified as one or two on the
ballot scale.  If there were more than 4 parties, at least one significantly smaller than the leading
parties and without a significant history of representation in the legislature, then countries were
given a 2 on the ballot variable.
7 Our reasoning is that these small, impermanent parties may
serve as vehicles for political entrepreneurs and thus be equivalent to successful “independent”
candidates.
We considered other features of the electoral systems in coding ballot for single-member
districts. Single-member districts (SMD) can be seen as a closed party list of one for smaller
districts. We code SMD as zero in countries where the majority of other districts are multi-
member closed-list proportional or where there was a single-party system such as in Mali, Sierra
Leone, or Bulgaria from 1981-1989. To universally code them as zero, however, might over-
emphasize the role that the party, as opposed to voters in the district, has in selecting the
candidate. Candidates’ popularity with voters in that district is likely to be a more important
factor in gaining access to a list of one than a list of several.  The rest of the SMD cases were
assigned a value of one, the category in which parties retain some control over the ballot but
voters can influence party choices for countries in which closed lists did not predominate.
In practice, our classification system sorts electoral systems along lines similar to the
“ballot” variable described in CS95.  The most significant difference is in the treatment of
SMDs, which they suggest coding as zero in all cases.
  Our attention to the procedures and
                                                                                                                                                                                          
6 Parties are allocated a block of seats proportional to the number of votes that their list received. These posts in the
legislature are awarded to individuals in the order that they appear on the list.
7 The group “others” is counted as 1 party.11
success rates for independent candidates may also lead to some discrepancies between the way
CS95 would code countries and the way that we have coded countries. Carey and Shugart, for
example, write that two describes systems where “candidates might gain ballot access by paying
a registration fee, by collecting signatures, through primaries, or through some combination of
these methods…The key is that politicians themselves determine their ballot access by acting as
individual political entrepreneurs.” We make this slightly more stringent by only classifying as
two those systems where independent candidacies are both feasible and successful in providing
political entrepreneurs with an alternative to party leaders’ dictates.  Those systems where
independent candidacies are possible and relatively common, but not often successful are
classified as one: access to the ballot is open, but access to the ballot in a position that is likely to
win is still controlled by party leaders and their willingness to endorse or nominate.
Pool, like the variable described in CS95, measures the extent to which a candidate can
ride his party’s reputation to electoral success. They designate the following categories: a score
of zero if votes cast are pooled across the whole party to determine the allocation of seats, one if
votes are pooled at the sub-party level, and two if votes cast for a candidate contribute only to
that candidate’s electoral success. The assumption is that candidates who receive no spillover
votes from party colleagues will compete harder to create personal support bases. There will be
less of a premium involved in belonging to a generally popular party or in working to make the
party popular in systems where there is little room to transfer votes across candidates within a
party. In standard economics language, a high value of pool means that the electoral success of a
given candidate does not produce any positive externality for other candidates of the same party.
At the same time, a low value of pool means that there are large externalities.
We diverge from CS95 in a subtle way in the coding of this variable. They define “pool”
according to whether votes for a candidate can also contribute to the probability of others in his
or her party winning seats in that electoral district.  We focus on this variable from the
candidate’s perspective and ask whether a candidate for national office can expect to benefit
from electoral support for other candidates in his party, possibly in other districts.
This difference in coding is most obvious in the case of SMD. While Carey and Shugart
classify most SMDs as pool equal to zero because each candidate is presented as a “list” of one
and votes for the candidate are thus pooled across the entire list, our definition leads us to
classify candidates in single-member districts as two on the pool scale because they do not12
receive additional electoral support if other candidates from their party are successful in other
districts.  We believe that, in general, the code of two more accurately reflects the incentives
candidates face in single-member districts where candidates on the ballot gain votes purely by
personal effort.  Single-party states are again an exception to this rule and are coded as zero.
Vote measures limitations on the number of individuals that voters can support.
Legislators will have a stronger incentive to please their voter constituencies where the number
of votes is limited and they must convince voters to choose them only.  They will have little
incentive to cater to the home constituency if they cannot attract votes individually, but only as a
party member.   As in CS95, the values range from zero for a single vote for a party, one for
multiple votes across candidates who may or may not have to be from the same party, and two
for a single vote for a single candidate.  Electoral systems where votes cast two votes, one for a
local candidate and another for a national candidate, are coded as one. The multiple votes may
also be spread across time, as in systems where there are multiple rounds of elections to narrow
the field of candidates. Systems with open primary elections are counted as having multiple
votes. We do not classify systems with rarely used tie-breaking runoffs, however, as allowing for
multiple votes. Candidates in these systems do not regularly expect to have to expand their
audiences after the first round.
Unlike CS95, however, SMDs are still coded as two except in single-party states, as
people are voting for a candidate.  We follow this coding to be consistent with our method of
coding Ballot. Classifying SMDs as zero would create some illogical combinations of Ballot
being equal to one or two, indicating that voters have some influence on who is in a viable place
on the ballot and Vote equal to 0, or party vote only.
One problem in generating countries’ values for Ballot, Pool and Vote is that some
countries use more than one method to elect different groups of legislators. Several of the
countries in our sample, such as Guatemala, have “mixed member proportional” electoral
systems in which some legislators are elected using proportional representation and closed lists,
while others are elected based on votes for individual candidates. To deal with this problem, we
started by coding the electoral systems for each of these groups separately and computed weights
using the number of legislators elected in each group.
Next, we computed ballot, pool, and vote, as the weighted averages of the coded values
for each group of legislators that is elected under a different set of rules. “Parallel” electoral13
systems where proportional representation seats are distributed after the national vote totals have
been determined, for example, are coded as if there are two groups of legislatures. The
“compensatory” seats are generally coded as zero for ballot, pool, and vote because parties
usually draw up the lists and assign the extra seats, while voters simply cast one vote for a
candidate.
We follow Shugart (1999) in averaging the scores of these three variables to create a
summary index of particularism for each set of legislators who are elected via a certain electoral
system. In some cases, this means a whole country or a whole house, while in mixed systems it
means a subset of legislators. Each group of legislators is then given a weight according to its
proportion of total legislators in the country.  In bicameral systems, each house is given a weight
of 0.5, regardless of the relative numbers of seats.
8
One problem that we faced in aggregating ballot, vote, and pool and the summary index
was that, in some countries, not all legislators were directly elected. We coded the indirectly
elected legislators as zero on all variables in countries such as Austria where the parties choose a
number of national legislators based on party shares in provincial legislators. In these cases it
seems clear that parties control access to and position on the “ballot” and that candidates receive
a positive externality from votes for others in their party. Citizens’ votes for provincial
legislators are effectively party votes for the national legislators.  We do not, however, code
legislators for whom the selection criteria were not based on citizen input or explicit party-based
formulas.
The summary score for countries with unelected legislators does not take into account the
incentives faced by all members of the legislature in these countries.  We note these cases by
creating a variable cindex that is equal to the proportion of all legislators included in the electoral
variables ballot, pool, vote, as well as the composite index. We emphasize that a score of less
than one on cindex does not mean that a country is “less representative” or less democratic. It
simply means that we do not have adequate information to discern the degree of citizen or party
control over politicians’ access to political power.
The Argentine Senate, for example, is not included as senators are selected by elected
provincial assemblies. The French Senate, elected by “electoral colleges” consisting of elected
                                                          
8 We thank Matthew Shugart for suggesting this method of taking the arithmetic means of the index averages for the
different groups.14
and unelected local officials, is also not coded. It would be reasonable to code these two
institutions as 0-0-0, as party affiliation of the electors seems to roughly predict the party
composition of the indirectly elected chamber. We leave it up to the data user, though, to adjust
the data if desired.
As outlined above, our coding of single member districts is perhaps the most significant
departure from the framework outlined in CS95 for the variables ballot, pool, and vote. Our
method of coding significantly increases the average country score relative to the strict
observance of the CS framework. We note single member districts in the background file so that
users who prefer to interpret single-member districts as closed lists of one can easily change the
coding accordingly. We also include an indicator variable of the proportion of single member
districts (smd).
3. Other Variables
District magnitude may affect the manner in which legislators build their personal reputation.
We have thus far assumed that an incentive to build a personal reputation was equivalent to an
incentive to cater to a narrow geographic constituency. Larger geographical districts are likely to
be less “narrow” and increase the need for legislators to internalize the consequences of
redistributive policies. It is more difficult to find a policy that does not create losers along with
winners in larger districts. Lancaster (1986) makes the point that pork-barrel policies, usually
distributive policies targeted to a particular constituency, are less likely to be successful vote-
attractors where geographical constituencies are larger.  Persson and Tabellini (2000) suggest
that electoral systems may affect the extent of targeted programs in a country:  “larger districts
diffuse electoral competition, inducing parties to seek support from broad coalitions in the
population. Smaller districts steer competition toward narrow, geographical constituencies.”
They then connect the means of electoral competition to broad classes of political outcomes:
broad programs are better for attracting broad support, while targeted (often called pork-barrel)
programs are more effective for narrow support.
Larger district magnitude, however, also increases the intensity of competition between
individual candidates and the need to differentiate oneself from others by some means. Large
district magnitude in candidate-centered systems, then, is expected to motivate more
particularistic behavior as candidates try to carve out individual niches.  Cox (1990) argues that15
more competition in a system will produce more centripetal forces. They, in turn, may lead to a
situation where politicians will be less inclined to cater to the median voter and more inclined to
carve out (particularistic) niches.  Carey and Shugart (1995) note this differential effect. They
hypothesize that the incentive to cultivate a personal reputation increases with district magnitude
in candidate-centered systems but decreases with district magnitude in closed-list systems where
parties determine who is on the ballot and what position they are in.
It is difficult, a priori, to determine which effect dominates or how politicians might go
about “differentiating themselves” without resorting to targeted “pork barrel” policies. We
include this variable without predictions as to its effect on policymaking or policy outcomes.
In keeping with our emphasis on the incentives that individual legislators face, we
measure average district magnitude from the viewpoint of the individual legislator. The country
average is then a weighted average of the various district magnitudes, with weights determined
by how many legislators run in districts of each size. The variable “avdm” would be calculated
as (200*200+100*1)/300 equal approximately 133 in a system with one 200-member national
district and 100 single-member districts. Standard calculation of average district magnitude by
dividing the number of seats by the number of districts would lead to a figure of 2.97
(=300/101), which obscures the fact that most legislators run in very large districts.
We rely on the district magnitude information in the Parline online database and the
International Parliamentary Union’s annual journal. Information from Table 3.2 in Cox (1997) is
used to supplement district magnitude information in the cross-section sample of 1996 data.
9
As an alternative to the index of particularism based on Carey and Shugart, we create an
alternate summary variable, propn, or the proportion of legislators from a national constituency.
As in the calculation of the index, pool, and vote, we weight each house as 0.5 in a bicameral
system.  Cases where candidates are indirectly elected by provincial legislators, or appointed by
subnational councils are considered to have non-national constituencies. The control variable
cpropn is in this case one minus the percentage of  candidates that are appointed by the head of
                                                          
9 Discrepancies between the Cox information and IPU information are noted in comments on the master spreadsheet.
In most cases these are slight: the district magnitudes reported in Cox sum to a few more or less seats than reported
by IPU. In cases where the discrepancies are more serious, such as the information for Italy, the IPU information is
given precedence, as it is more current and accounts for recent reforms. (In cases where a third source was available,
the IPU information reflected current electoral laws, and most large discrepancies were in systems where there have
recently been reforms.)16
state, governor-general, or monarch. These politicians’ loyalties to a geographically-defined
support base are not clear.
Proportional and majoritarian systems have been shown to have different effects on the
number of parties in government.
10 The distinction between the two broad categories of electoral
systems has also been made in theoretical papers on the links between electoral institutions and
economic policy. Proportional systems are said to give politicians an incentive to propose
broader spending programs and internalize policy benefits for larger segments of the population
than winner-take-all systems. The empirical paper of Persson and Tabellini (2000), for example,
finds that majoritarian elections are associated with smaller broad spending programs and
smaller deficits than proportional elections. Lizzeri and Persico (2000) present a model in which
proportional elections give politicians a greater incentive to provide public goods, while
majoritarian systems are associated with more emphasis on targeted expenditures.
We obtained the information for our dummy variable from the online database Parline,
IPU’s annual Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections and Developments, and the IDEA
International Handbook of Electoral System Design. Mixed systems are classified as
proportional representation if more than 50% of legislators are elected under a proportional
formula. We do not code single-party systems as proportional, as the number of seats a party has
is trivially equal to the proportion of votes its candidates received.
4. Summary Statistics
Table 1 reports regional average values for Ballot. Latin America and Central and East Europe
are the regions where parties have stronger control over ballots and Asia and the Middle East are
the regions in which political parties have the weakest control over electoral ballots.
11
                                                          
10 See Rae (1971), Blais and Carty (1987), or Lijphart (1994), for example.17
Table 1. Regional Values for Ballot (1997)
All Countries
Countries with more than
90 percent of elected
legislators
N. Obs. Mean Std. Dev. N. Obs. Mean Std. Dev.
Africa 37 0.68 0.55 23 0.51 0.56
Asia 23 1.05 0.61 16 0.95 0.53
Caribbean 12 0.83 0.39 2 0.50 0.71
Central Asia 7 1.08 0.42 6 1.10 0.45
Central and East Europe 14 0.55 0.38 13 0.55 0.40
Latin America 20 0.46 0.46 18 0.45 0.45
Middle East and North Africa 14 1.07 0.73 11 1.09 0.70
Industrialized Countries 28 0.80 0.34 21 0.81 0.33
Total 155 0.78 0.54 110 0.72 0.54
Table 2 reports regional average values for Pool. As in the case of Ballot, Latin America
and East Europe have the lowest average values, indicating large spillovers between candidates
(in this table we also find low values for the group of industrialized countries). At the same time,
Central Asia, Asia, and the Caribbean have high average values of Pool, indicating limited
spillovers among candidates of the same party.
Table 2. Regional Values for Pool (1997)
All Countries
Countries with more than
90 percent of elected
legislators
N. Obs. Mean Std. Dev. N. Obs. Mean Std. Dev.
Africa 37 0.95 0.97 23 0.71 0.93
Asia 23 1.51 0.78 16 1.42 0.80
Caribbean 12 1.67 0.78 2 1.00 1.41
Central Asia 7 1.80 0.38 6 1.93 0.17
Central and East Europe 14 0.64 0.60 13 0.54 0.63
Latin America 20 0.64 0.77 18 0.59 0.73
Middle East and North Africa 14 1.14 1.03 11 1.09 1.04
Industrialized Countries 28 0.65 0.75 21 0.44 0.63
Total 155 1.02 0.90 110 0.83 0.87
Table 3 reports regional average values for Vote. As in the case of Ballot and Pool, Latin
America and East Europe have the lowest average, indicating in that in these countries electors
tend to vote for a party rather than for a candidate. Central Asia, Asia, and the Caribbean have
instead high values of Vote, indicating candidate-centered systems.18
Table 3. Regional Values for Vote (1997)
All Countries
Countries with more than
90 percent of elected
legislators
N. Obs. Mean Std. Dev. N. Obs. Mean Std. Dev.
Africa 37 1.09 0.86 23 0.84 0.89
Asia 23 1.34 0.69 16 1.31 0.67
Caribbean 12 1.58 0.79 2 0.50 0.71
Central Asia 7 1.44 0.57 6 1.43 0.63
Central and East Europe 14 0.99 0.76 13 0.95 0.78
Latin America 20 0.71 0.83 18 0.68 0.80
Middle East and North Africa 14 1.21 0.80 11 1.18 0.75
Industrialized Countries 28 1.18 0.62 21 1.19 0.62
Total 155 1.15 0.78 110 1.02 0.77
Table 4 reports average regional values for the aggregate index of particularism. The
table indicates that Latin America and East Europe are the most party centered regions on the
world (with the group of industrialized countries coming third) and that Asia is the most
candidate-centered region in the world. The Caribbean is also highly-candidate centered, but
many of the countries in this region have an appointed upper house that is not considered in the
index and may allow parties more control over the political arena than our coding would suggest.
As noted before, countries with unelected legislators can be identified by values of cindex less
than one.
Table 4. Regional
12 Values for Index of Particularism (1997)
All Countries
Countries with more than
90 percent of elected
legislators
N. Obs. Mean Std. Dev. N. Obs. Mean Std. Dev.
Africa 37 0.90 0.74 23 0.69 0.75
Asia 23 1.33 0.62 16 1.26 0.60
Caribbean 12 1.36 0.64 2 0.67 0.94
Central Asia 7 1.44 0.34 6 1.49 0.35
Central and East Europe 14 0.73 0.49 13 0.68 0.49
Latin America 20 0.60 0.63 18 0.57 0.60
Middle East and North Africa 14 1.14 0.77 11 1.12 0.73
Industrialized Countries 28 0.88 0.43 21 0.81 0.40
Total 155 0.99 0.66 110 0.86 0.64
Table 5 summarizes our historical panel and shows that the cross-country average level
of particularism has been stable over the 20 years covered in our panel.
                                                          
12 See Appendix 1 for a list of countries in each region.19
Table 5. Historic Data (all countries)
Year Ballot Pool Vote Index of Particularism
Mean St. Dev. N. Obs.Mean St. Dev. N. Obs.Mean St. Dev. N. Obs.Mean St. Dev. N. Obs.
1978 0.81 0.51 61 0.97 0.90 59 1.19 0.78 60 1.01 0.62 59
1979 0.83 0.56 77 1.03 0.93 75 1.20 0.79 76 1.03 0.66 75
1980 0.80 0.57 92 1.06 0.94 88 1.16 0.81 88 1.02 0.68 88
1981 0.82 0.57 96 1.08 0.93 92 1.16 0.79 92 1.03 0.67 92
1982 0.82 0.57 95 1.06 0.93 91 1.15 0.79 91 1.02 0.67 91
1983 0.80 0.56 105 1.04 0.92 101 1.15 0.79 101 1.01 0.66 101
1984 0.79 0.55 116 1.05 0.91 112 1.17 0.80 112 1.02 0.66 112
1985 0.83 0.56 116 1.07 0.91 113 1.20 0.79 113 1.04 0.66 113
1986 0.83 0.56 116 1.07 0.91 113 1.19 0.79 113 1.04 0.66 113
1987 0.82 0.54 121 1.05 0.92 119 1.20 0.79 119 1.03 0.66 119
1988 0.81 0.54 117 1.03 0.92 114 1.20 0.79 114 1.02 0.65 114
1989 0.80 0.57 124 1.01 0.92 120 1.18 0.80 120 1.01 0.67 120
1990 0.81 0.56 122 1.03 0.92 118 1.21 0.78 118 1.03 0.65 118
1991 0.79 0.55 118 1.04 0.91 114 1.18 0.79 114 1.02 0.66 114
1992 0.80 0.54 130 1.02 0.91 127 1.19 0.78 127 1.02 0.65 127
1993 0.81 0.56 142 1.02 0.91 140 1.17 0.78 140 1.01 0.66 140
1994 0.80 0.54 145 1.01 0.90 144 1.15 0.77 144 0.99 0.65 144
1995 0.79 0.55 151 1.02 0.90 150 1.15 0.78 150 0.99 0.66 150
1996 0.78 0.54 154 1.02 0.90 152 1.16 0.78 152 0.99 0.66 152
1997 0.78 0.54 155 1.02 0.90 155 1.15 0.78 155 0.99 0.67 155
5. Conclusion
There is now a widespread consensus on the fact that institutions matter and that political
institutions may play an important role in shaping a country’s economic policies. However,
empirical work on this subject has been hampered by the lack of detailed cross-country data on
electoral system (exceptions are Persson and Tabellini, 2000, Milesi-Ferretti, Perotti and
Rostagno, 2000, and Gaviria, Panizza, Seddon and Stein, 2000).  This paper builds a large cross-
country dataset that describes the electoral systems of 167 countries over the 1978-1997 period.
While the dataset described in this paper is far from being a complete inventory of the
ways in which electoral systems can affect political incentives, it may be useful in providing the
tools to test some of the theoretical relationships between politicians’ incentives and economic
outcomes that have been highlighted in the theoretical literature.20
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Appendix 2. List of Files and Spreadsheet Page Names
Public.dta Stata  dataset
Public.xls Excel dataset
Histc Spreadsheet of coded values
Record Notes on coding22
Appendix 3. Variable Names and Brief Description
Variable Name Description
COUNTRY Country Name
SHCODE Summers and Heston code
BICAMERAL Dummy variable, 1 if bicameral system
YEAR Year
BALLOT Party control over access to and position on ballot
POOL Sharing of votes across candidates of the same party
VOTE Candidate or party specific voting
INDEX Summary index of particularism
CINDEX Control variable, proportion of legislators considered in index
DM District magnitude
SMD Proportion of legislators from single-member districts
PROPN Proportion of legislators from national districts
CPROPN Control variable, proportion of legislators considered in cpropn
PR Dummy variable, 1 if proportional representation.23
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